Staff Report 125

Sustainable Plans and Debt

Patrick J. Kehoe | Stanford University, University College London, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
V. V. Chari | University of Minnesota, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Published November 1, 1989

This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983), except that we let the government default on its debt. As a benchmark, we consider Ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit its policies at the beginning of time. We then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational. We concentrate on trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the finite horizon equilibrium after deviations by the government. The main result is that no Ramsey equilibrium with positive debt can be supported by such trigger mechanisms.

Published In: Journal of Economic Theory (Vol 61, No. 2, December 1993, pp. 230-261)
Published In: The legacy of Robert Lucas, Jr. (Vol. 3, 1999, pp. 325-356)

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