Staff Report 122

Sustainable Plans

Patrick J. Kehoe | Stanford University, University College London, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
V. V. Chari | University of Minnesota, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Published June 1, 1989

We propose a definition of time consistent policy for infinite horizon economies with competitive private agents. Allocations and policies are defined as functions of the history of past policies. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that satisfy certain sequential rationality conditions for the government and for private agents. We provide a complete characterization of the sustainable equilibrium outcomes for a variant of Fischer’s (1980) model of capital taxation. We also relate our work to recent developments in the theory of repeated games.

Published In: Journal of Political Economy (Vol 98, Num 4, 1990, pp. 783-802)
Published In: Monetary and fiscal policy (Vol. 1, 1994, pp. 143-163)

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