

Federal Reserve Bank  
of Minneapolis

Winter 2002

# Quarterly Review

**Decades Lost and Found:  
Mexico and Chile Since 1980** (p. 3)

Raphael Bergoeing  
Patrick J. Kehoe  
Timothy J. Kehoe  
Raimundo Soto

**2001 Contents** (p. 31)

**2001 Staff Reports** (p. 32)

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

# Quarterly Review

Vol. 26, No. 1

ISSN 0271-5287

This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental authorities.

*Any views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.*

---

Editor: Arthur J. Rolnick

Associate Editors: Patrick J. Kehoe, Warren E. Weber

Economic Advisory Board: V. V. Chari, Peter J. Klenow

Managing Editor: Kathleen S. Rolfe

Article Editor: Kathleen S. Rolfe

Production Editor: Jenni C. Schoppers

Designer: Phil Swenson

Typesetter: Mary E. Anomalay

Circulation Assistant: Elaine R. Reed

---

The *Quarterly Review* is published by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Subscriptions are available free of charge.

*Quarterly Review* articles that are reprints or revisions of papers published elsewhere may not be reprinted without the written permission of the original publisher. All other *Quarterly Review* articles may be reprinted without charge. If you reprint an article, please fully credit the source—the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank as well as the *Quarterly Review*—and include with the reprint a version of the standard Federal Reserve disclaimer (italicized above). Also, please send one copy of any publication that includes a reprint to the Minneapolis Fed Research Department.

Electronic files of *Quarterly Review* articles are available through the Minneapolis Fed's home page on the World Wide Web: <http://www.minneapolisfed.org>.

Comments and questions about the *Quarterly Review* may be sent to

*Quarterly Review*

Research Department

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

P. O. Box 291

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480-0291

(Phone 612-204-6455 / Fax 612-204-5515).

Subscription requests may also be sent to the circulation assistant at [elaine.reed@mpls.frb.org](mailto:elaine.reed@mpls.frb.org); editorial comments and questions, to the managing editor at [ksr@res.mpls.frb.fed.us](mailto:ksr@res.mpls.frb.fed.us).

## Decades Lost and Found: Mexico and Chile Since 1980\*

Raphael Bergoing  
Profesor Asistente de Economía  
Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial  
Centro de Economía Aplicada  
Universidad de Chile

Patrick J. Kehoe  
Monetary Adviser  
Research Department  
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis  
and Visiting Professor of Economics  
University of Minnesota  
and Research Associate  
National Bureau of Economic Research

Timothy J. Kehoe  
Distinguished McKnight University  
Professor of Economics  
University of Minnesota  
and Visiting Scholar  
Research Department  
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Raimundo Soto  
Profesor Asistente de Economía  
Instituto de Economía  
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Chile and Mexico, like most of the other countries in Latin America, experienced severe economic crises in the early 1980s that led to large drops in output. For these two countries, the paths of recovery from these crises differed markedly. Chart 1 shows that real output per working-age (15–64-year-old) person in Chile returned to trend in about a decade and grew even faster than trend during the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, real output in Mexico was still about 30 percent below trend in 2000. For Mexico, like much of the rest of Latin America, the 1980s were a “lost decade” while for Chile they were a “found decade” in which the economy began to grow spectacularly. Only after 1995 did Mexico begin to grow as Chile had done in the 1980s.

In this study, we analyze four possible explanations for the different paths of recovery in the two countries.

The first explanation is the *standard monetarist story* that, short of inducing a hyperinflation, the more rapidly a country in a severe recession expands its money supply, the faster it will recover. Although this story is not often proposed for the cases of Chile and Mexico, we examine

\*This article is a revision of an article published in the *Review of Economic Dynamics* (January 2002, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 166–205). The article appears here with the permission of Academic Press and Elsevier Science (USA). © 2002 by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. The article was edited for publication in the *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review*.

The authors would like to thank the participants at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank’s October 2000 “Great Depressions of the 20th Century Conference”—especially Pete Klenow—and participants at seminars at the Centre de Recerca del Economia de Benestar and the East-West Center, for helpful comments. The authors are also grateful to Edgardo Barandiarán, V. V. Chari, Bob Lucas, Rolf Lüders, Art Rolnick, Jaime Serra-Puche, and especially Ed Prescott, for useful discussions. Jim MacGee and Kim Ruhl provided invaluable research assistance, and Kathy Rolfe provided excellent editorial assistance. Bergoing thanks the Hewlett Foundation, Kehoe and Kehoe thank the National Science Foundation, and Soto thanks the Banco Central de Chile, for research support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

<sup>1</sup>Throughout we focus on output per working-age person—which is appropriate for our growth accounting and our model—rather than output per capita—which is not appropriate. Since both Chile and Mexico went through demographic transitions during 1960–2000 in which population growth rates fell sharply, the percentage of working-age persons in the total population changed, and these two measures of output do not move proportionately.

To detrend the GDP data in Chart 1, we use a common 2 percent growth rate, which comes close to matching both Chile’s and Mexico’s average annual growth rates over our entire sample, 1960–2000.

The sources for all the data used in this study are listed in Appendix A.



it because it probably is the most common story for both the severity of and the slow recovery from depressions like that of the 1930s in the United States.

The second explanation is Corbo and Fischer's (1994) *real wage story* for Chile's rapid recovery. After the crisis, the Chilean government reversed its previous policy of wage indexation and allowed real wages to fall sharply. Corbo and Fischer argue that this policy, together with policies that produced a rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate, fueled an export boom that was the principal cause of the rapid recovery.

The third explanation is Sachs' (1989) *debt overhang story* for Mexico's slow recovery. Sachs argues that Mexico's large external debt led new investors to fear that most of the returns on any new investment would be taxed to pay off old loans. Hence, new investors were discouraged from investing, and both investment and output remained low.

The fourth explanation is a *structural reforms story*. Chile had undertaken a series of structural reforms in the 1970s that set the stage for the successful performance of the 1980s. In contrast, Mexico undertook these reforms only in the mid-1980s or later. We examine reforms in a number of areas: trade policy, fiscal policy, privatization, the banking system, and bankruptcy procedures.

For each explanation we ask, Can it explain the different paths of recoveries in Chile and Mexico? We find that, although each of the first three explanations has some merit, none of these can account for the different paths of recovery: The standard monetarist story implies that Chile should have recovered more slowly than Mexico. The real wage story implies that exports should have boomed even more in Mexico than in Chile—and they did—but Mexico stagnated while Chile grew. The debt overhang story implies that Chile should have stagnated even more than Mexico.

A comparison of data from Chile and Mexico allows us to rule out only one part of the structural reforms story—trade reforms. The timing of reforms is crucial if they are to drive the differences in economic performance of the two countries. During the decade following the crisis, Mexico's trade grew faster than Chile's, partly because Mexico was engaged in vigorous trade reform while Chile had already carried out substantial reform (and, in fact, backtracked from 1983 until 1991). By the mid-1990s, Mexico was just as open as Chile.


To shed light on the ability of the other reforms to account for the different paths, we turn to a growth account-

## Charts 1–2

### Two Responses to Economic Crisis: Chile vs. Mexico


#### Chart 1 Real Output

Real GDP per Working-Age Person in Chile and Mexico  
Detrended by 2% per Year; Annually, 1980–2000  
Index, 1980 = 100



#### Chart 2 Productivity

Total Factor Productivity in Chile and Mexico  
Detrended by 1.4% per Year; Annually, 1980–2000  
Index, 1980 = 100



Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Bank, author calculations

ing exercise. We ask, How much of the differences in recoveries were due to differences in inputs of capital and labor and how much to differences in productivity? We find that most of the differences in the recoveries resulted from different paths of productivity.

Chart 2 depicts detrended total factor productivity (TFP) in Chile and Mexico. As we explain below, these TFP paths would have coincided exactly with the paths for output per working-age person, if factor inputs—measured in terms of the capital/output ratio and hours worked per working-age person—had remained constant. A comparison of Chart 2 to Chart 1 shows that more than two-thirds of the difference in output growth is due to the difference in TFP, leaving about a third to be explained by changes in factor inputs.

What causes changes in factor inputs? Some changes in capital accumulation and hours worked are induced by changes in TFP; others can be caused by changes in frictions in factor markets, like taxes and regulations. To distinguish between these two types of changes in factor inputs, we calibrate a growth model of a closed economy in which consumers have perfect foresight over the TFP sequence. Numerical experiments with this model indicate that virtually all of the difference in output between Chile and Mexico was due to the difference in TFP when we include the induced effects on factor inputs. There is no major role left to be played by frictions in factor markets that do not show up in TFP.

From our growth accounting exercise and numerical experiments, we conclude that the only reforms that are promising as explanations are those that economic theory dictates would show up primarily as differences in TFP, not those that would show up as differences in factor inputs. We use this implication to rule out fiscal reforms. These reforms primarily affect the incentives to accumulate capital and to work, not productivity. Moreover, the timing is not right for the fiscal reforms explanation: both countries had reformed their tax systems by the mid-1980s, so these reforms cannot account for the different paths.

We do find that fiscal reforms are important in explaining some features of the recoveries, just not the differences. In particular, when we use our calibrated model to quantitatively account for the recovery paths for Chile and Mexico, we find that a numerical experiment that incorporates the different paths for TFP but leaves out the fiscal reforms misses badly in both countries. In the same model, however, a numerical experiment that keeps the dif-

ferent paths for productivity and adds an identical fiscal reform in both countries fares much better.

If TFP movements drove both the initial downturns in Chile and Mexico and the difference in their recoveries, what drove the TFP movements? Our hypothesis is that external shocks initiated the TFP drops. These drops were magnified by existing government policies that made the financial sectors in both economies fragile. In Chile, rapid policy reform led to a recovery of TFP. In Mexico, the policy reaction to the initial shocks increased distortions, resulting in a prolonged decline in TFP.

In determining which reforms were crucial in driving the difference in the economic performances of the two countries, the matter of timing is crucial: reforms in privatization were probably less important than those in the banking system and bankruptcy procedures precisely because Chile had already reaped the benefits of these reforms while Mexico was reaping them during the period in which Mexico was stagnating and Chile was growing. The crucial differences between Chile and Mexico were in banking systems and bankruptcy procedures: Chile was willing to pay the costs of reforming its banking system and of letting inefficient firms go bankrupt; Mexico was not. This is not to say that the reforms in Mexican trade policy, fiscal policy, and privatization were not important. The long period of crisis and stagnation that afflicted Mexico from 1982 through 1995 would have been far worse without them.

Some good general references for the economic experience of Chile are Corbo 1985, Edwards and Edwards 1991, and Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Labán 1994; good general references for Mexico's experience are Aspe 1993 and Lustig 1998. Edwards 1998 provides an interesting comparison of the 1981–83 crisis in Chile with the 1994–95 crisis in Mexico.

### **Similar Initial Conditions . . .**

In the early 1980s, Chile and Mexico faced fairly similar conditions, at least on the macroeconomic level. Both countries had sizable foreign debts, appreciating real exchange rates, large current account deficits, and weaknesses in the banking system. Both countries were also hit by similar external shocks. These shocks consisted of a jump in world interest rates, plummeting prices of their primary exports, and a cutoff of foreign lending.

Some simple data provide a feel for the initial conditions. Like many developing countries, Chile and Mexico took advantage of low world interest rates in the late 1970s



to build up large levels of foreign debt. By 1982, total external debt in Chile, which had grown by 134 percent in U.S. dollars since 1978, was 71 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In Mexico by 1982, total external debt had grown by 140 percent in U.S. dollars since 1978 and was 53 percent of GDP. The real exchange rate against the U.S. dollar—and the United States was by far both Chile's and Mexico's largest trading partner—had appreciated between 1978 and 1981 by 26 percent in Chile and by 27 percent in Mexico. The current account deficit in 1981 was 14.5 percent of GDP in Chile, while in Mexico it was 5.8 percent. By the end of 1982, foreigners stopped financing new capital inflows, and the current account deficits disappeared. The banking systems in Chile and Mexico were so vulnerable to the shocks that buffeted their economies that, in both countries, the government found it necessary to take over private banks. During the crisis, in Chile the government took over distressed banks and nonbank financial institutions (*financieras*) that held more than 55 percent of the assets in the financial sector, and in Mexico the government nationalized all banks.

The following data provide a feel for the magnitude of the two most important external shocks: interest rate shocks and export price shocks. Loans to Chile and Mexico were offered at a spread over the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). Between 1978 and 1981, in response to contractionary U.S. monetary policy, the three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR jumped from 8.8 percent to 16.8 percent per year. In the early 1980s, Chile was heavily dependent on its exports of copper, which accounted for 48 percent of its total exports in 1980. Mexico was similarly dependent on its exports of crude petroleum, which accounted for 52 percent of total exports in 1980. Chart 3 plots the prices of copper and crude petroleum deflated by the U.S. producer price index (PPI). This relative price of copper fell 39 percent between 1980 and 1982, while that of crude petroleum fell 21 percent. By the end of 1982, following Mexico's default, essentially no new private foreign loans were granted to Chile or Mexico until the end of the decade. Although Chile's total external debt increased by 4 percent and Mexico's increased by 9 percent between 1982 and 1989, almost all of the increases can be accounted for by loans from the International Monetary Fund and, in the case of Mexico, accumulation of unpaid interest.


### ... Why Different Recoveries?

Despite the similarities in their initial conditions, Chile and Mexico experienced very different recoveries from

Chart 3

### Export Price Shocks

London Price of Copper and World Price of Crude Petroleum Deflated by U.S. Producer Price Index; Annually, 1980–2000  
Index, 1980 = 100



Source: International Monetary Fund

their crises. In this section, we consider four potential explanations for these different recoveries. Comparing the case of Chile with that of Mexico allows us to rule out three of these explanations. Although a story may have some merit when applied to one of the countries in isolation, we rule it out if it is incapable of explaining the differences between the experiences of the two countries.

### Standard Monetarist Story

Crudely stated, the standard monetarist story is that, short of inducing a hyperinflation, the more rapidly a country in a depression expands its money supply, the faster it recovers. We include this story, not because it has been proposed as a serious explanation of the experiences of Chile and Mexico, but rather because it is probably the most common story offered for recovery from an economic crisis. Even though we have oversimplified the story, the basic theme can be found in Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) analysis of the Great Depression in the United States and is pervasive in the literature.

Charts 4 and 5 present data on rates of growth of the money supply and inflation for both Chile and Mexico. If we focus on 1983–95, the crucial period in which Chile

was growing while Mexico was still mired in crisis, we see that the annual growth rate of the money supply was substantially higher in Mexico than in Chile. This higher growth of money was associated with a faster growth of prices in Mexico than in Chile. It does not show up, however, in a faster growth of output for Mexico in Chart 1. Indeed, output per working-age person contracted in Mexico while it grew in Chile. Of course, even the most avid proponents of the monetarist story do not claim that monetary forces can account for a decade of growth. Nevertheless, it is interesting that these forces seem incapable of explaining even a single year or two of the path of output following the crisis: for every year in the period 1983–88, Mexico had a higher growth rate of money than did Chile, but a lower growth rate of output per working-age person.

While the monetarist story seems unable to account for the different paths of recovery, part of the downturn may well be associated with monetary factors. The jump in world interest rates that adversely affected Chile and Mexico was clearly associated with a monetary contraction in the United States. Moreover, in a failed effort to defend its nominal exchange rate, Chile contracted its money supply during the first three quarters of 1982, and this policy may have deepened and prolonged its crisis. Of course, this argument begs the question of why Chile recovered so rapidly while Mexico, which had no contraction, did not.

Although we have treated the monetarist story in a superficial manner, at first blush it does not seem to be a promising route to follow. More generally, in most Latin American countries, high inflation is often associated with large drops in output, not with substantial recoveries. It may be that this pattern for Latin America is quite different from the patterns in the United States and Europe in which large drops in output are associated with deflations, not inflations. If so, this is an area that warrants further study.

#### *Real Wage Story*

In an influential article, Corbo and Fischer (1994) make a case for a real wage story to explain Chile's experience. Corbo and Fischer argue that one of the principal causes of Chile's crisis in the early 1980s was the government's policy of mandating that wages be adjusted at least one-for-one with past inflation, while at the same time fixing the nominal exchange rate for the four years before the crisis. Given the high inflation the country had already experienced, these policies led to a continuation of past inflation, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and a sharp increase in real wages. After the crisis, the govern-

#### Charts 4–5

#### The Standard Monetarist Story?

Annual % Changes in Chile's and Mexico's Money Supply\* and Consumer Price Index, 1980–2000

Chart 4 Chile



Chart 5 Mexico



\*Money = Currency outside of deposit money banks  
+ Demand deposits other than those of the central government.

Source: International Monetary Fund

ment reversed its position. It undid its wage indexation policies and allowed the real exchange rate to depreciate.

Chart 6 shows that real wages in Chile's manufacturing industries declined by about 15 percent in the three years




Charts 6–9

The Real Wage Story?

Chart 6 Real Wages


Wages in Manufacturing Industries in Chile and Mexico  
Deflated by Consumer Price Index; Annually, 1980–2000  
Index, 1980 = 100



Sources: Chile's Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas,  
International Monetary Fund, Organisation  
for Economic Development and Co-operation

Chart 7 Real Exchange Rate


Exchange Rate of Chile's and Mexico's Currency  
With the U.S. Dollar, Multiplied by the U.S. Consumer Price Index  
and Divided by the Country's Consumer Price Index  
Annually, 1980–2000; Index, 1980 = 100



Source: International Monetary Fund

Chart 8 International Trade


Nominal Exports and Imports of Chile and Mexico  
as a % of Nominal GDP; Annually, 1980–2000



Source: International Monetary Fund

Chart 9 Another View of Exports

Chile's and Mexico's Exports Valued in U.S. Dollars  
Deflated by U.S. Producer Price Index  
Annually, 1980–2000; Index, 1980 = 100



Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Bank,  
World Trade Organization



after 1982. Furthermore, as shown in Chart 7, between 1981 and 1987, Chile's real exchange rate against the U.S. dollar depreciated by 124 percent. This decline in wages, together with the depreciation of the real exchange rate, according to Corbo and Fischer (1994), generated an export boom, shown in Chart 8, that was the principal cause of Chile's rapid recovery.

The story of declining real wages and a depreciating real exchange rate generating an export boom that spurred the recovery sounds convincing for Chile. But can it explain the differences in the economic performances of Chile and Mexico? Probably not. The fall in real wages was substantially greater in Mexico than in Chile: in the two years following the crisis, real wages fell by almost 30 percent, compared with 15 percent in Chile (Chart 6). Furthermore, from Chart 7 we see that between 1981 and 1987, the Mexican peso depreciated by 95 percent against the U.S. dollar (from 92 to 179), compared with 124 percent for Chile's peso (from 92 to 206). As Chart 8 shows, exports as a percentage of GDP boomed in Mexico as well as in Chile.

The data in Chart 8, which express exports as a percentage of GDP, can be misleading as indicators of the movements in value of exports when there are substantial fluctuations in GDP and in the real exchange rate. Looking at the value of exports in U.S. dollars deflated by the U.S. PPI in Chart 9, we see that the value of Chile's exports actually fell after 1981 while that of Mexico's exports rose, falling below its 1981 level only briefly in 1986. Much of the movement in the dollar value of Chile's and Mexico's exports should come as no surprise, given the data on commodity prices in Chart 3. What is surprising is that, even though the price of copper recovered in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the price of crude petroleum did not, the dollar value of Mexico's exports grew faster during this period than did the value of Chile's. By 2000, Mexico was exporting 427 percent more than it had in 1981, measured in terms of deflated U.S. dollars, while Chile was only exporting 250 percent more. Moreover, returning to Chart 8, we see that, by 2000, Mexico's ratio of trade to GDP exceeded Chile's—even though Mexico's economy was seven times larger, and smaller countries typically have much higher ratios of trade to GDP.

If declining real wages and a depreciating real exchange rate generated an export boom in Chile, they had even more pronounced effects in Mexico. Yet, after 1983, Chile's economy recovered rapidly while Mexico's stagnated. Consequently, we need to look elsewhere for an explanation of the differences in the recoveries.

### *Debt Overhang Story*

A hypothesis often associated with Sachs (1989) for Mexico's slow recovery is the debt overhang story. The idea is that Mexico's large external debt led to fears by potential new investors that most of the returns on any new investment would eventually be used to pay down old loans. Potential new investors viewed the outstanding debt as leading to future (implicit or explicit) taxes on the returns to their new investments. Hence, these investors were discouraged from making new investments, and private incentives were distorted toward consuming rather than investing. The larger the outstanding debt, the higher the implicit tax on new investment and the lower the actual investment.

To analyze this story, we plot the ratio of foreign debt to output in Chile and Mexico in Chart 10, and we plot the investment rate in these two countries in Chart 11. It is clear that, both during and after the crisis, Mexico had an increasing ratio of debt to output and that, during the same period, Mexico's investment/output ratio fell below its pre-crisis level. So, at least for Mexico, the pattern is not inconsistent with Sachs' story.

Can Sachs' story explain the difference between Chile's fast recovery and Mexico's slow recovery? As Chart 10 makes clear, both during and after the crisis, Chile had a much higher debt/output ratio than Mexico. Furthermore, in Chart 11, we see that Chile's investment rate fell more abruptly than Mexico's and only caught up and passed it in 1989. Looking at macroeconomic aggregates like investment rates, we do not see how debt overhang can explain the different recoveries of Chile and Mexico.

Before leaving the debt overhang story, we want to make two comments. First, in some versions of the debt overhang story, it is the quantity of public debt that impedes new investment, and a larger portion of Mexico's debt was public debt at the onset of the crisis than was Chile's: in 1981 only 35.6 percent of Chile's debt was public or publicly guaranteed, while 80.8 percent of Mexico's was. Following the government bailout of Chile's banking system, however, the portion of debt in Chile that was public or publicly guaranteed shot up, reaching 86.3 percent in 1987, compared to 85.6 percent in Mexico. If the crucial factor in the debt overhang story is the level of public debt rather than that of total debt, Chile had more public debt overhang during the crucial period when it was recovering and Mexico was not.

Second, comparing Chart 10 with Chart 7, we see that most of the fluctuations of both countries' ratios of debt to output were due to depreciation of the domestic currency.

This depreciation increased the relative value of debt, which was mostly denominated in U.S. dollars. This suggests that Corbo and Fischer's real wage story for Chile's recovery, which says that depreciation is good because it drives up exports, conflicts with Sachs' debt overhang story for Mexico's stagnation, which says that depreciation is bad because it drives up the relative value of foreign debt. Neither story is capable of explaining the differences between the economic performances of Chile and Mexico.

### Structural Reforms Story

A promising explanation of the different recovery patterns is the structural reforms story. In the 1970s Chile had undertaken structural reforms that set the stage for successful performance of the economy in the 1980s. These reforms covered trade policy, fiscal policy, privatization, the banking system, and bankruptcy procedures. In contrast, Mexico only undertook such reforms in the mid-1980s or later. Could the different timing of the reforms have determined the different recovery patterns? Here we argue that neither trade policy reforms nor fiscal reforms can explain the differences. Privatization, banking, and bankruptcy reforms, however, may well be able to.

#### □ Trade Policy

Consider first the differences in trade policy. (For details, see, for example, De la Cuadra and Hachette 1991 and Kehoe 1995.) We argue that Mexico engaged in far more trade reform during the period 1983–95 than did Chile. By 1979 Chile had eliminated all quantitative restrictions on imports and imposed a uniform tariff of 10 percent. In Chile, the uniform tariff was increased to 20 percent in 1983 and to 35 percent in 1984 and then gradually lowered until it fell below its original level in 1991. In Mexico, there was massive protection in 1985. In addition to tariffs, import licenses protected 100 percent of domestic production, and there were numerous other nontariff barriers and a system of dual exchange rates that gave preferred treatment to industries favored by the government. Starting in the mid-1980s, however, Mexico embarked on a trade liberalization policy that culminated in the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994.


Trade liberalization, like real exchange rate depreciation, generated exports in both Chile and Mexico, but it is hard to see how differences in the timing determined the different recoveries. As we have seen in Charts 8 and 9, trade grew more in Mexico than in Chile during the crucial period 1983–95, partly because Mexico was more closed than Chile to start with.

## Charts 10–11

### The Debt Overhang Story?


#### Chart 10 Foreign Debt

Total External Debt in Chile and Mexico as a % of GDP; Annually, 1980–2000



#### Chart 11 Investment

Nominal Investment in Chile and Mexico as a % of GDP; Annually, 1980–2000



Sources: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Banco Central de Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean



#### □ *Fiscal Policy*

Consider next the differences in fiscal policy. We argue that both countries engaged in significant tax reforms during the 1980s. In Chile, there was a major tax reform in 1975, a major social security reform in 1980, and another major tax reform in 1984. In Mexico, there were major tax reforms in 1980 and in 1985. Corporate tax policy in Mexico was reformed in 1987 and 1989 to lower distortions on investment. As Chart 12 indicates, throughout much of the 1980s, Chile ran either a government surplus or a small deficit, while Mexico ran a deficit on the order of 10 percent of GDP.

Fiscal reforms undoubtedly played important roles in both Chile and Mexico in inducing higher rates of capital accumulation and hours worked. Hsieh and Parker (2001), for example, stress the importance of tax reforms in spurring investment in Chile. Below, we use growth accounting and numerical experiments with a growth model to argue that these reforms had roughly similar impacts on both economies—leaving the difference in their performances still unexplained.

#### □ *Privatization*

Now consider differences in privatization. (For details, see, for example, Hachette and Lüders 1993 and Glade 1996.) We argue that, although both countries underwent substantial privatization, it is unclear which privatization program had the greatest impact in the early 1990s, when Chile was growing and Mexico was still stagnating. In Chile, by the end of the Allende administration in 1973, a large fraction of the economy was under direct or indirect government control. From 1974 to 1979, the Chilean government reprivatized much of the economy. In contrast, following the 1982 crisis in Mexico, the government nationalized the banking system and, moreover, effectively appropriated the banks' holdings of private companies. Economists like Lustig (1998) estimate that, directly or indirectly, the government controlled from 60 to 80 percent of GDP. In 1984, Mexico began to reprivatize what it had nationalized, but only after 1989 was the reprivatization substantial. The nationalized banks were only privatized after 1990. The different paces of privatization had effects both on the incentives to accumulate capital and on the efficiency with which that capital was allocated.

It is worth pointing out, however, that it is easy to exaggerate the importance of privatization in Chile relative to that in Mexico. Although the number of state enterprises in Chile was reduced from 596 in 1973 to 48 in 1983, the portion of GDP generated by state enterprises fell only

from 39 percent to 24 percent over this period. Chile's national copper company, Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO), was still run by the government in 2000, and that year its exports of copper accounted for 13.8 percent of Chile's exports. In contrast, crude petroleum exports in Mexico, which are controlled by the government's *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX), accounted for 9.8 percent of Mexico's exports in 2000. Significantly, however, the government in Chile has allowed private competition in copper extraction, while the government in Mexico has not done so in petroleum extraction.

#### □ *The Banking System*

We turn now our attention to the banking system. (For details, see, for example, Gruben and Welch 1996 and Barandiarán and Hernández 1999.) We argue that it is in this area, together with that of bankruptcy procedures, that timely reforms in Chile spurred its recovery while lack of reforms left Mexico to stagnate.

One place that differences in the workings of the banking systems manifested themselves is in the amount of private lending in the two economies. Chart 13 graphs private credit (which consists of all loans to the private sector and to nonfinancial government enterprises) as a percentage of output. Clearly, there was substantially more private lending taking place in Chile than in Mexico. In 1973 Chile had 18 national banks and one foreign bank. After a series of financial reforms that included deregulation, a drop in reserve requirements to low levels, and an opening of the system to foreign competition, the number of financial institutions increased by 1980 to 26 national banks, 19 foreign banks, and 15 *financieras*, the latter being nonbank financial institutions that were subject to less stringent regulations than banks. The explosion of financial institutions that were not highly regulated and that paid market-determined interest rates led to an explosion in private credit.

In Mexico, in contrast, banks were few, highly regulated, and subject to very high reserve requirements. The government set very low deposit rates in order to give low interest rate loans to preferred industries. Overall, the banking system in Mexico was used by the government as a way to channel funds to preferred borrowers at low interest rates.

These differences in banking systems led to huge differences in the allocation of credit in the two economies after the crisis. In Chile, credit allocation was determined mostly by the market; in Mexico, it was determined by the government. Although banks and financial institutions




Charts 12–14

The Structural Reforms Story

Chart 12 Differences in Fiscal Policy . . .


Chile's and Mexico's Government Surplus as a % of GDP; Annually, 1980–2000



Source: International Monetary Fund

Chart 14 . . . And Bankruptcy Procedures


Number of Business Bankruptcies in Chile Annually, 1980–2000



Source: Chile's Ministerio de Justicia

Chart 13 . . . The Banking System . . .

Private Credit\* in Chile and Mexico as a % of GDP; Annually, 1980–2000



\*Private credit = Claims on the private sector + Claims on nonfinancial public enterprise.

Source: International Monetary Fund

collapsed and were taken over by the government in both countries, the authorities reacted in very different ways when rescuing the financial sector and restoring credit flows. The Chilean authorities liquidated insolvent banks and *financieras*, quickly reprivatized solvent banks that had been taken over because of liquidity problems, and set up a new regulatory scheme to avoid mismanagement. Banks were able to channel credit to firms at market rates—which were very high immediately following the crisis. The banking reforms in Chile were costly: Sanhueza (2001) estimates that during 1982–86, the costs amounted to 35 percent of one year’s GDP.

In Mexico, in contrast, banks were nationalized and credit was allocated discretionarily at below-market rates. Chart 13 shows that credit to the private sector fell in Mexico after 1982 and continued to be very low for most of the decade. In fact, despite the massive bailout during the 1994–95 crisis, Mexico’s banking system still failed to provide credit to the private sector at levels comparable to that in Chile even in the late 1990s. In contrast, in Chile credit to the private sector expanded during 1982–84 and steadily declined as a fraction of GDP during the rest of the decade mostly because of GDP growth. In retrospect, it appears that the immediate cost of the bank bailout paid for by Chile during the crisis was more than compensated by later gains.

#### □ *Bankruptcy Procedures*

Finally, consider differences in the timing of the reform of bankruptcy procedures.

In Chile, the 1929 bankruptcy law did not provide for an efficient and timely administration of bankruptcies because it relied on poorly paid public officials (*sindicos*) and highly bureaucratic procedures. Until the late 1970s, bankruptcy proceedings languished for years in courts. Following an administrative reform of the bankruptcy management service in 1978, the 1982 bankruptcy reform law clearly defined the rights of each creditor and replaced public *sindicos* with private *sindicos*. The law was passed at the onset of the crisis, and the government allowed firms to go bankrupt, avoiding the use of subsidies to keep them afloat, under the conviction that protection would unnecessarily lengthen the adjustment period.

It was this reform to bankruptcy procedures, in retrospect, that was crucial in making the initial phase of the crisis more severe in Chile than in Mexico. Chart 14 shows that in Chile bankruptcies increased ninefold between 1980 and 1982, but quickly returned to average levels.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, Mexico had an obsolete and unwieldy

bankruptcy law from 1943 in place until 2000. The 2000 bankruptcy law includes features similar to Chile’s 1982 law, particularly the establishment of bankruptcy specialists (*especialistas de concursos mercantiles*), who are intended to play much the same role as *sindicos* in Chile. Our interpretation is that Chile paid the short-term costs of letting many firms fail, and this led to a sharp, but short, fall in output followed by a strong recovery. Mexico, in contrast, attempted to muddle through the crisis. It had a less severe initial downturn, but a much weaker recovery.

Like privatization and the reforms in banking, the reform of bankruptcy procedures in Chile had effects both on the incentives to accumulate capital and on the efficiency with which that capital was allocated. We argue that for all three of these reforms, it was effects on efficiency that were crucial for explaining the differences between Chile and Mexico after the crisis. Some support for this view is given by the data in Chart 11, which show that the investment rate in Mexico was not much below that in Chile. Our growth accounting analysis in the next section bolsters this view, namely, that most of the differences in the paths of recovery stem from differences in productivity and not from differences in factor inputs. Hence, for these types of reforms to account for the different paths of recovery, they must have two features. First, they must show up primarily in productivity. Second, given the timings of reforms discussed above, they must have dynamic effects on productivity that show up gradually over time.

#### **Different Productivity Paths . . .**

To see whether the different timing of reforms can explain the different economic performances of Chile and Mexico, we use growth accounting to answer two questions: What portion of the different performances of Chile and Mexico can be accounted for by differences in inputs of capital and labor? What portion can be accounted for by differences in the efficiency with which these factors were used, or TFP? Basically, our answer is that most of the differences are due to differences in the paths of TFP and little to differences in inputs.

#### *Growth Accounting*

For our growth accounting analysis, we employ the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function

---

<sup>2</sup>It would be useful to collect more data on bankruptcies in Chile and, especially, Mexico. It is telling, however, that no data comparable to those in Chart 14 seem to exist for Mexico.



$$(1) \quad Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}$$

where  $Y_t$  is output,  $K_t$  is capital,  $L_t$  is labor, and  $A_t$  is total factor productivity (TFP),

$$(2) \quad A_t = \frac{Y_t}{K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}}$$

all for period  $t$ . To calculate  $A_t$ , given series for  $Y_t$  and  $L_t$ , we need to choose a value for  $\alpha$ , capital's share of output, and to generate a series for  $K_t$ .

National income accounts indicate that the share of labor compensation in GDP valued at factor prices (GDP at market prices minus indirect taxes) in both Chile and Mexico is small relative to, say, that in the United States. In 1980, for example, according to the United Nations (1986), this share—which corresponds to  $1 - \alpha$  in our production function—was 0.53 in Chile and 0.42 in Mexico. Nevertheless, we choose a higher value of the labor share for our growth accounting and numerical experiments, 0.70—corresponding to  $\alpha = 0.30$ —for two reasons. First, measured labor compensation fails to account for the income of most self-employed and family workers, who make up a large fraction of the labor force in countries like Chile and Mexico. Gollin (forthcoming) shows that, for countries where there is sufficient data to adjust for this mismeasurement, the resulting labor shares tend to be close to the value in the United States, 0.70. Second, a high capital share implies implausibly high rates of return on capital in our numerical experiments. (In Appendix B, we provide alternative growth accounting and numerical experiments for a production function in which  $\alpha = 0.60$ . The qualitative nature of our conclusions does not change.)

To calculate a capital stock series, we cumulate investment,  $I_t$ , using

$$(3) \quad K_{t+1} = (1-\delta)K_t + I_t$$

for some chosen depreciation rate  $\delta$  and an initial condition on capital. We use a depreciation rate  $\delta = 0.05$  for both countries, and for the initial condition on capital, we assume the capital/output ratio was the same in 1960 in Chile as its 1961–80 average and the same in 1950 in Mexico as its 1951–80 average.<sup>3</sup> As a check, we note that with these choices, the share of capital consumption in GDP, which in the model is measured by  $\delta K_t/Y_t$ , is equal

to the number reported by the United Nations (1986) for Mexico in 1980. To reproduce the corresponding number for Chile in 1980, we would need a higher depreciation rate,  $\delta = 0.08$ . We choose to use  $\delta = 0.05$  for two reasons. First, we want to use the same production technology in our growth accounting and numerical experiments for Chile as for Mexico. Second, a higher value of  $\delta$  for Chile yields implausibly low values of the capital/output ratio there. (In Appendix B, we provide alternative growth accounting and numerical experiments for a production technology in which  $\delta = 0.08$ . The qualitative nature of our conclusions does not change.)

Given our choice of  $\alpha$  and generated series for  $K_t$ , we can calculate TFP series. Recall that Chart 2 plots the detrended TFP series for Chile and Mexico. The rate used to detrend these series is 1.4 percent per year because in a balanced growth path, where output and capital per worker grow by 2 percent per year, TFP would have to grow by 1.4 percent per year ( $1.02^{1-0.3} = 1.0140$ ). What is striking about Chart 2 is how closely the TFP data match those for GDP per working-age person in Chart 1. (In fact, the correlation between detrended  $A_t$  and detrended  $Y_t/N_t$  is 0.92 for Chile and 0.99 for Mexico. Here  $N_t$  is the number of working-age persons.) This similarity suggests that it was not changes in inputs that were responsible for the crises and recoveries in Chile and Mexico, but rather the efficiency with which these factors were used.

Taking natural logarithms of the production function, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002) in rearranging terms to obtain

$$(4) \quad \log\left(\frac{Y_t}{N_t}\right) = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \log A_t + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \log\left(\frac{K_t}{Y_t}\right) + \log\left(\frac{L_t}{N_t}\right)$$

where  $N_t$  is the number of working-age persons. We use this expression to decompose the change in real GDP per working-age person from period  $t$  to period  $t + s$  as

<sup>3</sup>The calculation of the capital stock series here differs slightly from that in Bergeoning et al. 2002, which explains the minor differences between our growth accounting and numerical experiments here and in that article.



$$(5) \quad \frac{\log\left(\frac{Y_{t+s}}{N_{t+s}}\right) - \log\left(\frac{Y_t}{N_t}\right)}{s} = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{\log A_{t+s} - \log A_t}{s} \right) + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left[ \frac{\log\left(\frac{K_{t+s}}{Y_{t+s}}\right) - \log\left(\frac{K_t}{Y_t}\right)}{s} \right] + \frac{\log\left(\frac{L_{t+s}}{N_{t+s}}\right) - \log\left(\frac{L_t}{N_t}\right)}{s}.$$

The first term on the right side of this equation is the contribution to growth of TFP changes, the second is the contribution of changes in the capital/output ratio, and the third is the contribution of changes in hours worked per working-age person. On a balanced growth path, output per worker and capital per worker grow at the same rate, and the capital/output ratio and hours worked per working-age person are constant. On such a path, our growth accounting would attribute all growth to changes in TFP. In our growth accounting, therefore, the second two terms measure the contributions of deviations from balanced growth behavior: changes in the investment rate and changes in hours worked per person.

Column (1) in the accompanying table presents the growth accounting for Chile and Mexico during the period from 1981 to 2000. This growth accounting confirms the impression given by comparing Charts 1 and 2. Most of the economic fluctuations in output per working-age person  $Y_t/N_t$  in the two countries were due to changes in total factor productivity  $A_t$  rather than changes in the capital/output ratio  $K_t/Y_t$  or in the hours per working-age person  $L_t/N_t$ . In Chile, TFP accounted for a fall in the logarithm of output per working-age person of 0.19, compared to 0.22 in the data, during the crisis period 1981–83; it accounted for an increase of 0.61, compared to 0.75 in the data, during the recovery period 1983–2000. In Mexico, TFP accounted for a 0.39 fall, compared to 0.25 in the data, during the crisis and stagnation periods 1981–95; it accounted for an increase of 0.13, compared to the increase of 0.15 in the data, in the recovery period 1995–2000.<sup>4</sup>

### Numerical Experiments

Although growth accounting indicates that most of the changes in output in Chile and Mexico were due to changes in TFP, the contributions of changes in the capital/output ratio and of changes in hours worked per working-age person were not negligible. How much of these changes can we account for as equilibrium responses to the observed productivity shocks in a growth model?

#### □ A Model

To answer this question, we calibrate a simple growth model of a closed economy in which consumers have perfect foresight over the sequence of TFP shocks to Chile and to Mexico. The representative consumer maximizes this utility function

$$(6) \quad \sum_{t=1980}^{\infty} \beta^t [\gamma \log C_t + (1-\gamma) \log(N_t \bar{h} - L_t)]$$

subject to the budget constraint in each period,

$$(7) \quad C_t + K_{t+1} - K_t = w_t L_t + (1-\tau_t)(r_t - \delta)K_t + T_t$$

and an initial condition on capital,  $K_{1980}$ . Here  $C_t$  is consumption;  $\bar{h}$  is the number of hours available for work, taken to be 100 hours per week, 52 weeks per year; and  $N_t \bar{h} - L_t$  is leisure. In addition,  $r_t$  and  $w_t$  are the marginal products of the production function with respect to capital and labor and  $\tau_t$  is the income tax rate on capital income, which we start by assuming fixed, but later lower to mimic the fiscal reforms, in Chile and Mexico in the 1980s. Also,  $T_t$  is a lump-sum transfer that in equilibrium is equal to the tax revenue  $\tau_t(r_t - \delta)K_t$ . (In Appendix B, we show that the qualitative nature of our conclusions are not very sensitive to the specification of the utility function.)

Given the production technology that we have used for growth accounting, the feasibility constraint for this model is

$$(8) \quad C_t + K_{t+1} - (1-\delta)K_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

<sup>4</sup>In interpreting our results, remember that we are using logarithmic approximations to growth rates, which are accurate for small rates, but not for large ones. The logarithmic approximation says, for example, that Mexico's output per working-age person grew by 15.2 (=  $5 \times 3.04$ ) percent between 1995 and 2000; it actually grew by 16.4 percent ( $e^{0.152} = 1.164$ ). The logarithmic approximation says that Chile's output per working-age person grew by 75.3 (=  $17 \times 4.43$ ) percent between 1983 and 2000; it actually grew by 112.3 percent ( $e^{0.753} = 2.123$ ). The major advantage of using logarithms is that they allow us to do an additive decomposition of the determinants of growth.

## Growth Accounting for Chile and Mexico

Decomposition of Average Annual % Changes in Real Output per Working-Age Person  
During 1981–2000, Actual Data and Two Model Experiments

Country	Time Period & Variable	% Change in Real Output in			
		(1) Data	(2) (3) Experiments		
			Base Case	Tax Reform	
Chile	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–83</i></b>				
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-11.19	-11.62	-11.62	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	-9.68	-9.68	-9.68	
	Capital/Output Ratio	5.36	6.39	6.39	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	-6.87	-8.33	-8.33	
	<b><i>Recovery, 1983–2000</i></b>				
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	4.43	2.82	4.44	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	3.53	3.53	3.53	
	Capital/Output Ratio	-.13	-1.26	-.19	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	1.03	.55	1.10	
	Mexico	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–87</i></b>			
		Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-3.28	-4.84	-4.84
		Due to Total Factor Productivity	-5.24	-5.24	-5.24
		Capital/Output Ratio	2.08	3.11	3.11
Hours per Working-Age Person		-.12	-2.71	-2.71	
<b><i>Stagnation, 1987–95</i></b>					
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		-.66	-1.61	.04	
Due to Total Factor Productivity		-.99	-.99	-.99	
Capital/Output Ratio		.64	-.21	.53	
Hours per Working-Age Person		-.31	-.41	.50	
<b><i>Recovery, 1995–2000</i></b>					
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		3.04	2.03	2.56	
Due to Total Factor Productivity		2.59	2.59	2.59	
Capital/Output Ratio		-.74	-1.94	-1.26	
Hours per Working-Age Person	1.19	1.38	1.23		

Source: Author calculations



Here we include government spending and net exports in consumption. To run numerical experiments, we need to impose values on the parameters  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  in the consumer's utility function and on the tax parameter  $\tau_t$ . Using the first-order conditions for the maximization problem of the representative consumer in our model economy, we obtain

$$(9) \quad \beta = \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}[1 + (1 - \tau_t)(r_t - \delta)]}$$

$$(10) \quad \gamma = \frac{C_t}{C_t + w_t(N_t \bar{h} - L_t)}$$

Rather than fix the tax rates in Chile and Mexico and estimate a different discount factor  $\beta$  for each country, we fix  $\beta = 0.98$  in each country and estimate a different average tax parameter  $\tau_t$  over the period 1960–80. We obtain  $\tau_t = 0.56$  for Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.45$  for Mexico. Our view is that people are fundamentally the same across countries, but that different tax distortions induce different consumption-investment decisions. To find  $\gamma$ , however, we simply take averages using equation (10) and data from 1960–80. We estimate  $\gamma = 0.28$  for Chile and  $\gamma = 0.30$  for Mexico.

It would be equally possible to fix the same value of  $\gamma$  in both countries and to estimate different tax distortions to consumption-leisure decisions, like consumption taxes and labor taxes, for each country. Despite some changes in these sorts of taxes in both Chile and Mexico, however, we find that the value of  $\gamma$  in (10) does not vary much over the period 1960–2000 in either country. It is worth remembering, however, that our estimates of  $\gamma$  implicitly incorporate differences in tax distortions and labor market institutions in the two countries.

#### □ *The Base Case*

Column (2) in the table and Charts 15–17 and 21–23 report the results of our *base case* numerical experiments. In each country, we set  $K_{1980}$  equal to its observed value in 1980 and compute the perfect foresight equilibrium path, where the sequence of TFP ( $A_{1980}, A_{1981}, \dots, A_{2000}$ ) is given by data and TFP after 2000 is assumed to grow at the same average rate as it did over the period 1960–2000.

Notice in the table that, for both Chile and Mexico, the model captures well that initial decline in output per

working-age person, but misses from about 1985 on. In particular, it predicts that this detrended output should in 2000 be about 20 percent below its value in the data in both countries. In terms of the model's results, it seems equally surprising that Chile did so well in its recovery period and that Mexico did not do worse.

#### □ *Tax Reform*

Our discussion of structural reforms in the previous section suggests that changes in taxes may have changed incentives to accumulate capital in both Chile and Mexico. We analyze this possibility by running new numerical experiments in which we introduce *tax reform* in both countries. Using (9), we estimate that Chile had a tax rate of  $\tau_t = 0.13$  and Mexico had a tax rate of  $\tau_t = 0.12$  over the period 1988–2000. Column (3) in the table and Charts 18–20 and 24–26 report the results of numerical experiments in which we compute the equilibrium for which consumers have perfect foresight between 1980 and 1988, they are surprised by a tax reform in 1988 that in Chile lowers  $\tau_t$  from 0.56 to 0.12 and in Mexico lowers  $\tau_t$  from 0.45 to 0.12, and they have perfect foresight from then on. We impose the same tax reform in both countries to make the point that, although tax reforms had significant effects on factor inputs in both countries, it was not differences in these tax reforms that drove the difference in economic performances.

Notice that the model now does an accurate job of accounting for both the crises and the recoveries in Chile and Mexico. Furthermore, there is some direct evidence that the sorts of tax distortions that we have estimated are sensible. In Chile, for example, taxes on firms' income were lowered from 0.46 to 0.10 percent in 1984; this tax was increased to 0.15 in 1991. (See Larraín and Vergara 2000.) For Mexico, there is no similar simple tax rate to report, but the tax reform in 1987 that allowed firms to deduct the present discounted value of future capital depreciation allowances had a large positive impact on incentives to invest. Interestingly, although the tax reform has direct effects only on the incentive to accumulate capital, it increases the incentive to work by raising real wages.<sup>5</sup>

The tax reform that we have imposed on the model is crude and is sure to miss important institutional details

<sup>5</sup>Notice that the model overpredicts hours worked in the early 1980s in both countries, both before and during the crisis. This is not a matter of secular trends. Remember that the crucial parameter,  $\gamma$ , for determining hours worked is calibrated to data from the 1960s and 1970s. The number of hours worked per working-age person was, in fact, low by historical standards during the early 1980s in both countries.



Charts 15–20

Numerical Experiments for Chile . . .

Annually, 1980–2000

Variable	Experiment	
	Base Case	Tax Reform

Output per Working-Age Person (Detrended)  
Index, 1980 = 100  
Y/N

Chart 15





Chart 18



Ratio of Capital to Output  
K/Y

Chart 16





Chart 19



Hours Worked per Working-Age Person per Week  
L/N

Chart 17





Chart 20



Charts 21–26

... and for Mexico

Annually, 1980–2000

Experiment

Variable

Base Case

Tax Reform

Output per Working-Age Person (Detrended)

Index, 1980 = 100

$Y/N$

Chart 21





Chart 24



Ratio of Capital to Output

$K/Y$

Chart 22





Chart 25



Hours Worked per Working-Age Person per Week

$L/N$

Chart 23





Chart 26





and matters of timing. (The results for Chile, for example, look better if we impose the tax reform earlier.) Nonetheless, the results of our numerical experiments are striking, and the message is clear: Changes in tax policy were undoubtedly important in both countries, but they cannot explain more than a small fraction of the differences in the recoveries. In both Chile and Mexico, changes in the capital/output ratio and changes in hours worked per working-age person contributed to making the recovery stronger than the base case model predicts. Within the context of our model, the same crude tax reform in both countries can roughly account for these changes in factor inputs. Consequently, to explain the different experiences in Chile and Mexico, we need to explain the different performances of TFP.

### . . . Due to Different Government Policies

If TFP movements drove both the initial downturns in Chile and Mexico and the difference in recoveries, what drove the TFP movements? We think that external shocks initiated the TFP drops and that these drops were magnified by existing government policies that made the financial sectors in both economies fragile. In Chile, rapid policy reform led to a recovery of TFP. In Mexico, the policy reaction to the initial shocks increased distortions, resulting in a prolonged decline in TFP.

#### *Likely and Unlikely Explanations*

Economic theory suggests two obvious mechanisms for the initial TFP drops: (1) Higher real interest rates make some previously profitable investment projects unprofitable and make the capital involved unproductive. Our measure of TFP assumes full utilization of capital and, hence, attributes this drop in utilization to TFP. (2) A deterioration in the terms of trade requires a country to export more to obtain the same quantity of imports, so more domestic resources are needed to produce the same final output. Hence, in a closed economy model, negative terms of trade shocks manifest themselves as declines in TFP.

While these mechanisms can account for part of the initial TFP drops in both countries, they cannot account for either the severity of these drops or the difference in the recovery paths. In our view, mistakes in government policies made the financial systems in both countries fragile and, hence, exacerbated the effects of the initial external shocks. But what drove the striking difference in the patterns of recovery of TFP seen in Chart 2? Our view is that higher productivity growth in Chile was driven by the timing of privatization and banking and bankruptcy re-

forms. Furthermore, given the data on the speed of, and relative importance of, privatization in the two countries, we conjecture that reforms to the banking system and bankruptcy procedures were quantitatively more important than privatization in determining the differences in productivity.

Our hypothesis is that, before reforms, government policy distorted the allocations of resources both within and across sectors in Chile and Mexico, pushing the economies inside their aggregate production possibility frontiers. As reforms were implemented, first in Chile and later in Mexico, each economy moved closer to its production possibility frontier. Here we propose a theory of how distortions in the financial system and poorly designed bankruptcy procedures can have negative effects on productivity. We describe first the static effects of distortions on allocations of resources and then the dynamic effects on the entry and exit decisions of firms.

Before we turn to our theory, however, let us contrast our hypothesis with a potential explanation for measured productivity movements that is common in the business cycle literature. (See, for example, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1993.) This explanation is that unobserved movements in factor utilization cause large movements in measured productivity. Although this mechanism can have some effect at the onset of a crisis, as we have pointed out, we argue here that it cannot explain large and increasing differences in productivity over periods longer than a decade.

To make this mechanism concrete, suppose that aggregate output  $Y$  is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas function

$$(11) \quad Y = A(uK)^\alpha(eL)^{1-\alpha}$$

where  $0 \leq u \leq 1$  is unobserved capacity utilization of capital and  $0 \leq e \leq 1$  is unobserved labor effort. It is important to note that variations in  $e$  do not correspond to variations in the employment rate, the participation rate, or average hours worked; if these variations are properly measured, they show up as variations in  $L$ . If we observed  $K$  and  $L$  in the data and did not observe  $u$  or  $e$ , we would identify movements in  $u^\alpha e^{1-\alpha}$  as changes in productivity instead of identifying them as movements in factor utilization. In our growth accounting exercise, for example, we have used  $L/N$  to measure hours worked per person, but we ideally should have used  $eL/N$ .

Such shifts in utilization may play a role in the initial phase of the crisis. It seems farfetched, however, to argue that they can account for large differences in productivity movements between countries over a period of a decade or more, when firms are making new investments and hiring new workers. Indeed, in Mexico, the country with falling productivity, the story would have to be that, at the same time that the average firm in Mexico was gradually lowering its utilization rate of capital, it was investing in new capital. Similar comments apply to labor: at the same time firms were supposedly hoarding labor by requiring low effort, on average, they were hiring new workers. This type of behavior is inconsistent with that of firms in the standard growth model.

One could imagine a richer model in which some firms were underutilizing factors and hiring no new factors at the same time that others were utilizing factors fully and hiring new factors. Even so, it is hard to imagine that this situation could have persisted and even worsened for as long as a decade. Presumably, during that long a period, the depreciation of physical capital and the natural turnover of workers would have gradually raised the utilization rates, not persistently lowered them.

#### Two Types of Policy Effects

##### □ Static

A government's favored treatment of certain sectors can interfere with the market mechanism, leading to a static misallocation of resources and lower aggregate productivity. To see this in the simplest possible example, consider an economy with two sectors in which labor  $L_i$  produces a homogeneous output good  $Y_i$  according to the production function  $Y_i = A_i L_i^\alpha$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ . For simplicity, set  $A_1 = A_2 = 1$ . The aggregate resource constraint is  $L_1 + L_2 = L$ .

Before the reform, sector 1 is the government enterprise sector that is subsidized at rate  $\tau_1$ , and sector 2 is the private sector that is taxed at rate  $\tau_2$ . Any residual from the taxes and subsidies is financed with lump-sum taxes or transfers. A competitive labor market equates the marginal products of labor in the two sectors, which implies that

$$(12) \quad \frac{L_1}{L_2} = \left( \frac{1 + \tau_1}{1 - \tau_2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

Substituting the allocations of labor back into the resource constraint and solving yields

$$(13) \quad Y(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \frac{1 + \left( \frac{1 + \tau_1}{1 - \tau_2} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 + \tau_1}{1 - \tau_2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right]^\alpha} L^\alpha.$$

Now imagine a privatization that sets to zero both the subsidy and the tax. The efficient allocation of labor would be  $L_i = L/2$ , and the aggregate output would be  $Y(0,0) = 2^{1-\alpha} L^\alpha$ . Relative to the efficient allocation, before reform the government enterprise in sector 1 produces too much output, and the private firm in sector 2, too little output. Overall, output in the economy is lower before reform than it is afterward. If  $\alpha = 3/4$  and  $\tau_1 = \tau_2 = 1/3$ , for example, then output in the distorted economy is about 10 percent less than that in the undistorted economy. Consequently, productivity would rise with the reform.

This example illustrates how distortions can affect the static aggregate production possibility frontier. We have focused on a direct subsidy, but any differential treatment of one sector over another will have a similar impact. The example illustrates how, in theory, different paths for privatization in the two countries can lead to different paths for aggregate productivities.

In terms of the data, the timing of the privatization in the two countries does not match up well with the differences in productivity. This makes it doubtful that privatization can be the main force that accounts for the different paths of productivity. During the period 1987–95, Chile was growing and Mexico was stagnating. In Chile, most privatization had already occurred well before this time, while in Mexico it was vigorously under way. Consequently, unless there are long lags between changes in incentives and changes in the allocation of resources, this story will not work. Galal et al. (1994) and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) estimate that improvements in productivity were achieved very rapidly in privatized firms in Chile and Mexico.

Reforms in the banking system can also reduce static inefficiencies similar to those in the privatization story above. Suppose that, before banking reform, the government chooses some firms or sectors to favor with low interest rate loans. With the return on deposits held fixed, these lower interest rates for the favored sector must be



paid for either by higher rates in the unfavored sector or by transfers to the banking system from the government.

Consider a model in which, for simplicity, we suppress labor and let the production functions be given by  $A_i K_i^\alpha$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ . Sector 1 receives a proportional subsidy of  $\tau_1$  on the interest rate that it pays on loans, and sector 2 pays a tax  $\tau_2$ . The first-order conditions for profit maximization are

$$(14) \quad \frac{\alpha A_1 K_1^{\alpha-1}}{1 - \tau_1} = \frac{\alpha A_2 K_2^{\alpha-1}}{1 + \tau_2} = r.$$

We can think of these subsidies and taxes as being accomplished through preferential lending by banks. Any net revenues that are needed are supplied to the banks using lump-sum taxes or transfers. The relative allocations of capital are given by

$$(15) \quad \frac{K_1}{K_2} = \left( \frac{A_1}{A_2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{1 + \tau_2}{1 - \tau_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

In contrast to the efficient outcome, a higher fraction of the capital stock is allocated to the subsidized sector than is warranted by the differences in productivity. For a fixed level of total capital, these distortions lower the amount of output due to sectoral misallocations, as with privatization. If these distortions decrease the incentives to make loans, as they did in Mexico, then they can also lead to a lower level of overall capital and have an additional negative effect on output.

Despite the static nature of the inefficiency, this story has potential for explaining the differences in TFP performance. Banking reform was the major reform that Chile had done poorly in the 1970s and had to redo in the 1980s. (See Galvez and Tybout 1985 for a description of the sort of preferential lending arrangements that existed for some firms, but not others, in Chile before the crisis.) In Mexico, however, until at least the early 1990s, the banking system remained nationalized, gave subsidized loans to some firms, and rationed loans to others.

#### □ *Dynamic*

Distortions in the financial system and poorly designed bankruptcy procedures can lead to lower aggregate productivity in dynamic ways too. These structural features can both discourage poorly performing firms from exiting

from production and prevent new potentially productive firms from entering.

The models developed by Atkeson and Kehoe (1995) and Chu (2001) can be used to address such issues. In these models, new firms enter with the newest technology, stochastically learn over time, and then exit when their prospects for further productivity improvements are poor. In such models, any policy that interferes with the natural birth, growth, and death of production units based on prospective productivities can move the economy further and further inside the production possibility frontier and will show up as a decrease in measured productivity. Simulations by Chu (2001) indicate that these dynamic distortions can have enormous effects over time.

To get some idea of how this sort of model works, consider Atkeson and Kehoe's (1995) model in which production is done in a continuum of plants. Each plant has its own level of productivity  $A$  and is operated by a manager. A plant with productivity  $A$  has the production function  $y = A^{1-\nu} (k^\alpha l^{1-\alpha})^\nu$ . The manager's span of control parameter,  $\nu < 1$ , determines the degree of diminishing returns at the plant level. A manager who decides to operate a plant chooses capital  $k$  and labor  $l$  to maximize static returns

$$(16) \quad d_t(A) = \max_{k,l} A^{1-\nu} (k^\alpha l^{1-\alpha})^\nu - r_t k - w_t l - w_t^m$$

where  $w_t^m$  is the manager's opportunity cost of not working or starting another plant. Let the solutions be denoted  $k_t(A)$  and  $l_t(A)$ . For a given distribution  $\lambda_t(A)$  of productivities across plants, it is easy to show that aggregate output is given by  $Y_t = \bar{A}_t^{1-\nu} K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}$ , where

$$(17) \quad \bar{A}_t = \int_A A \lambda_t(dA)$$

is aggregate productivity and  $K_t = \int_A k_t(A) \lambda_t(dA)$  and  $L_t = \int_A l_t(A) \lambda_t(dA)$  are aggregate capital and labor. That is, aggregate productivity depends on the mean of the productivities of all of the plants that are in operation.

Over time, the productivity of each plant evolves stochastically: a plant with productivity  $A$  at  $t$  has random productivity  $A\epsilon$  at  $t + 1$ , where the shock  $\epsilon$  is drawn from a probability distribution  $\pi(\epsilon)$ . The crucial decision for the manager of whether or not to operate a plant is dynamic and is described by the Bellman equation

$$(18) \quad V_t(A) = \max[0, V_t^o(A)]$$

where

$$(19) \quad V_t^o(A) = d_t(A) + \frac{1}{1+R_t} \int_{\varepsilon} V_{t+1}(A\varepsilon)\pi(d\varepsilon).$$

Here  $R_t$  is the market rate of interest between periods  $t$  and  $t+1$ ,  $V_t^o(A)$  is the value if the plant is operated in the current period, and  $V_t(A)$  is the maximum of the returns from either closing the plant or operating it. New plants can enter according to a similar process. The outcome of all the managerial decisions to operate or not is a new distribution  $\hat{\lambda}_{t+1}(A)$  over productivities in period  $t+1$ .

So far we have described a simple version of the model in which the probability distribution  $\pi(\varepsilon)$  that generates shocks to plant-specific productivity does not change with plant age. In the data, the labor employed and output produced by a cohort of plants tend to start low when the plants are young, grow for the next 20 years or so, and then gradually decline. (For evidence from Chile, see, for example, Camhi, Engel, and Micco 1997.) To capture this sort of pattern, Atkeson and Kehoe (1995) modify the model. They add a frontier level of new technology that grows over time, and they allow the mean value of shocks to the productivity of a plant to increase and then to decrease. In the model, new plants start with the newest technology, but little specific knowledge on how to use it. Over time, these plants build up their specific knowledge and grow as they draw shocks to productivity from a distribution with an increasing mean. After 20 years or so, the mean of the shocks  $\varepsilon$  starts to fall, as the learning process slows. Plants then decline in size and eventually exit.

Now consider the effects of a distortion in the financial system in which the government encourages the banks to lend at a subsidized rate  $R_{1t} = \hat{R}_t(1-\tau_{1t})$  to firms (identified with plants in the model) in sector 1 and to lend to other firms at a relatively high rate  $R_{2t} = \hat{R}_t(1+\tau_{2t})$ . The favored firms discount the future less than the unfavored ones. Substituting these distorted interest rates into the Bellman equation (18) produces different solutions to the managers' dynamic programming problems in sectors 1 and 2. In particular, favored firms will choose to continue to operate in situations where unfavored firms would choose to shut down. Even if a favored firm experiences a low productivity  $A$ , it will be more prone than an unfavored firm to borrow to cover losses and to continue operating, hoping for a favorable shock  $\varepsilon$  to increase its productivity in the future.

Consider next the effects of inefficient bankruptcy procedures that make it difficult for firms to exit or that subsidize the losses of firms to keep them operating. This distortion causes firms to keep operating for longer than they would have with no distortions.

Together, distortions in the financial system and bankruptcy procedures change the mix of firms that operate in the economy, leading to inefficiently many low-productivity firms continuing. This leads to a lower value of aggregate productivity  $A$ .

How would the removal of these distortions affect the path of productivity over time? Some effects would be immediate. Upon removal, some previously favored firms that would have continued will fail, and some unfavored firms that would have failed will continue. The subtler, and potentially more important, effects take more time to show up in aggregates. The removal of distortions would encourage new firms to enter. Such new firms would have the newest technologies, but would build up their organization-specific productivity only slowly over time. Consequently, removing these distortions would show up with a lag in the aggregate productivity statistics.

Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) present evidence that most of the increase in productivity in manufacturing in Chile in the mid-1980s was due to the exit of inefficient firms and expansion of efficient firms—rather than to within-firm productivity increases. This sort of evidence provides crucial microeconomic evidence for our story of the role of reforms in the banking system and the bankruptcy procedures. It would also be useful to obtain micro data on bank loans and bankruptcies, especially in Mexico. As it stands, the data in Charts 13 and 14 provide only circumstantial evidence.

Our theory also provides an important role for barriers to entry of new firms. Djankov et al. (2002) provide evidence that such barriers are much higher in Mexico than they are in Chile. What we need to look for is evidence on how these barriers changed during the 1980s and 1990s.

### Concluding Remarks

The sort of lag between government policy change and the resulting change in productivity discussed above may, in fact, provide major roles for Chile's trade reforms and privatization in the 1970s in explaining productivity increases a decade or more later. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) and Pavcnik (forthcoming), for example, present micro evidence that trade liberalization and export growth in Chile and Mexico caused inefficient firms to exit and efficient firms to grow. Openness to foreign direct invest-



ment and deregulation in domestic industry—once again, reforms that took place in Chile earlier than in Mexico—also may have played significant roles. In Chile, for example, foreign direct investment grew from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1983 to 4.5 percent in 1995, while in Mexico it only grew from 1.5 percent to 3.3 percent.

To disentangle the dynamic effects of these reforms on productivity and output from the effects of banking and bankruptcy reforms, more work is needed. The tasks for the future are to collect more micro data, build a quantitative model that incorporates the theoretical structure sketched out here, and calibrate that model to Chile and Mexico. The challenge is to use the same model to explain why Chile boomed while Mexico stagnated. In this study, we have provided sharp directions pointing to where the explanation can and cannot be.

## Appendix A Data Sources

Here we identify the sources of all the data used in the discussion and experiments of the text and displayed on the charts and tables.

### Text Data

The data on current account deficits, LIBOR, and nominal exchange rates are from the International Monetary Fund's monthly publication, *International Financial Statistics (IFS)*. The data on copper and crude petroleum exports in 1960 are from the United Nations' *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*; these same data for 2000 are from the Web sites of the Banco Central de Chile (<http://sie.aplicaciones.cl/basededatoseconomicos>) and Mexico's *Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática* (<http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx>). The data on the exports of CODELCO in 2000 are from the Web site of the Comisión Chilena del Cobre (<http://www.cochilco.cl/home/esp/framesetestadistica.htm>). The data on the fraction of total external debt that is public or publicly guaranteed are from the CD-ROM of the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2001 (WDI)*. The data on the fraction of GDP generated by government enterprises are from *WDI*. The data on foreign direct investment are from *IFS*. The data on the share of assets in the Chilean financial system held by institutions taken over by the government are from Sanhueza 2001.

### Growth Accounting Data

The GDP series are from *IFS*. The investment series used to compute the capital stocks is the sum of two series reported in *IFS*: gross fixed capital formation and change in inventories.

The labor series have been estimated using data from a number of sources. The labor inputs for both countries are the products of total employment and a survey of average hours per worker.

The labor series in Chile is calculated using data on total employed from the Penn World Table 5.6 (<http://www.nber.org/pwt56.html>) for 1980–85 and total employment reported in *IFS* for 1985–2000. The hours series is average hours worked in urban Santiago from the survey *Encuesta de Ocupación y Desocupación para el Gran Santiago*, which is released quarterly by the Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Chile.

In Mexico, total employment for 1980–90 is total employment from the Penn World Table 5.6 multiplied by the ratio of that employment and *IFS* employment in 1988. This series is spliced with the available data on employment reported in *IFS* for the 1990s. The data for missing years are calculated using linear interpolation. Employment in Mexico in 1999 is calcu-

lated as the product of the economically active population in 1999 and the ratio of employment in 1998 to the economically active population in 1998, all as reported in *WDI*. Employment in 2000 is calculated by multiplying the value of an index of manufacturing employment in 2000 reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in a monthly publication, *Main Economic Indicators*, by the average ratio of this index to total employment over the 1996–99 period. The average hours worked in Mexican manufacturing series is calculated using an index of total hours and an index of total employment from *Main Economic Indicators*.

### Chart Data

#### Chart 1

The real GDP series are indices of real GDP volume from *IFS*. The population aged 15–64 is from *WDI*. These data end in 1999. The population aged 15–64 in 2000 is estimated by linear extrapolation.

#### Chart 2

The total factor productivity data are the result of calculations described in the "Growth Accounting" section of the study. The calculations use equations (1) and (3), the output and labor series from Chart 1, and assume values of capital's depreciation rate and share of output.

#### Chart 3

Data for both commodity prices are from *IFS*. The price of copper is the London price, while the price of oil is the average world price. Both series are deflated using the U.S. PPI from *IFS*.

#### Charts 4–5

All money and inflation data are from *IFS*. Money is defined as the sum of currency outside of deposit money banks and demand deposits other than those of the central government.

#### Chart 6

The real manufacturing wage for Chile is a series reported in *Indicadores Mensuales de Empleo y Remuneraciones* from Chile's Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. The real wage in manufacturing for Mexico is created by splicing a series reported in *IFS* with a series from the OECD's *Main Economic Indicators*. The *IFS* series is deflated using the consumer price index (CPI) reported in *IFS*. The OECD series is a real series. These series are spliced using their ratio in 1995.



#### Chart 7

The real exchange rates are calculated using period averages of the nominal exchange rates and CPIs from *IFS*.

#### Chart 8

The international trade series are the ratios of nominal imports and exports and nominal GDP from *IFS*.

#### Chart 9

The export values in U.S. dollars are from *WDI* and the World Trade Organization's *International Trade Statistics 2000*. The U.S. PPI is from *IFS*.

#### Chart 10

Total external debt for 1980–99 is from *WDI*. The GDP series are from *IFS* and are converted into U.S. dollars using period average nominal exchange rates from *IFS*. The 2000 value is obtained from two publications: the Banco Central de Chile's *Boletín Mensual*, Julio 2001 (no. 881), for Chile and the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean's *Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2001*.

#### Chart 11

Nominal investment and nominal GDP are from *IFS*.

#### Chart 12

The government surplus is from *IFS*, except for Chile's in 2000. That is from the *Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas 1991–2000*, published by the Dirección de Presupuestos of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

#### Chart 13

Both the private credit and GDP series are from *IFS*. Private credit is the sum of claims on nonfinancial public enterprise and claims on the private sector.

#### Chart 14

The data on business bankruptcies in Chile correspond to the number of new filings, not the number of resolutions. These data were provided to the authors by the Fiscalía Nacional de Quiebras of the Ministerio de Justicia. Unfortunately, data on the revenue of bankrupt firms are not available.

#### Charts 15–16

The sources for actual data on Charts 15–16 are the same as those identified above for growth accounting.

#### Table Data

The data in the three tables are the results of our numerical experiments, described in the body and Appendix B of the study.

## Appendix B Sensitivity Analysis

Tables B1 and B2 present the results of the growth accounting and the numerical experiments for alternative specifications of the model—changes in the production and utility functions. None of these alternative specifications produce results significantly different from those of the original specifications.

### Production Function

Table B1 presents the results for specifications of the model with alternative production technologies: the sort of large capital share suggested by Chile and Mexico's national accounts,  $\alpha = 0.60$ , and the sort of high depreciation rate suggested by Chile's national accounts,  $\delta = 0.08$ . With these specifications, the growth accounting and the numerical exercises still indicate that it is mostly fluctuations in TFP that account for the different growth paths of Chile and Mexico.

The specification with  $\alpha = 0.60$  is unattractive because it implies implausibly high (before-tax) rates of returns on capital, averaging over 25 percent in both countries throughout 1960–2000. These returns are out of line with the sorts of real interest rates found in the International Monetary Fund's *International Financial Statistics*.

The specification with  $\delta = 0.08$  is unattractive because it implies implausibly low capital/output ratios, averaging 1.48 in Chile and 1.62 in Mexico over the period 1960–2000.

Both specifications require unattractive calibrations of capital taxes. For the specification with  $\alpha = 0.60$ , we estimate  $\tau_t = 0.82$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.77$  in Mexico during the period 1960–80 and  $\tau_t = 0.70$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.68$  in Mexico during the period 1988–2000. In the numerical experiments with a tax reform, we lower  $\tau_t$  to 0.68 in both countries in 1988. For the specification with  $\delta = 0.08$ , we estimate  $\tau_t = 0.51$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.61$  in Mexico during the period 1960–80 and  $\tau_t = 0.26$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.19$  in Mexico during the period 1988–2000. In the experiments with a tax reform, we lower  $\tau_t$  to 0.19 in 1988.

### Utility Function

Table B2 presents the results for specifications of the model that use an alternative utility function:

$$\sum_{t=1980}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{N}_t^\eta \frac{\left[ \left( \frac{C_t}{\tilde{N}_t} \right)^\gamma \left( \frac{N_t - L_t}{N_t} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right]^\phi - 1}{\phi}.$$

Here  $\tilde{N}_t$  is an adult equivalent measure of population that puts weight 0.5 on persons not of working age and weight 1.0 on working-age persons. The utility function used in the body of the study is, of course, the special case where  $\phi = \eta = 0$ .

The second and third columns of numbers in Table B2 report the results of numerical experiments with less intertemporal substitutability, where  $\phi = -1$  and  $\eta = 0$ . The fourth and fifth columns report the results of experiments with higher population weight, where  $\phi = 0$  and  $\eta = 1$ . Because neither specification changes the production technology, the growth accounting stays the same as that in the body table. For the specification with  $\phi = -1$ , we estimate  $\tau_t = 0.52$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.39$  in Mexico during the period 1960–80 and  $\tau_t = -0.02$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.06$  in Mexico during the period 1988–2000. In the experiments with a tax reform, we lower  $\tau_t$  to 0.06 in 1988. For the specification with  $\eta = 1$ , we estimate  $\tau_t = 0.75$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.67$  in Mexico during the period 1960–80 and  $\tau_t = 0.32$  in Chile and  $\tau_t = 0.46$  in Mexico during the period 1988–2000. In the experiments with a tax reform, we lower  $\tau_t$  to 0.46 in 1988.

### Results

With these alternative specifications, the numerical experiments still indicate that the differences in TFP paths account for most of the differences in the economic performances of Chile and Mexico. Notice, however, that, for the experiments reported in Table B2, the model with the tax reform does not account for all of Chile's recovery. Since there are large discrepancies between the estimated capital income tax rate  $\tau_t$  for Chile and Mexico over the period 1988–2000, imposing the Mexican tax rate on Chile is not as successful here as it is in the original tax reform experiment.



Tables B1–B2

Alternative Model Specifications for Chile and Mexico

Decomposition of Average Annual % Changes in Real Output per Working-Age Person  
During 1981–2000, Actual Data and Model Experiments With Different Values for Some Parameters

Table B1 Alternative Production Technologies

Country	Time Period & Variable	% Change in Real Output With						
		Larger Capital Share ( $\alpha = 0.60$ )			Higher Depreciation Rate ( $\delta = 0.08$ )			
		Data	Experiments		Data	Experiments		
		<i>Base Case</i>	<i>Tax Reform</i>		<i>Base Case</i>	<i>Tax Reform</i>		
Chile	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–83</i></b>							
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-11.19	-10.65	-10.65	-11.19	-10.72	-10.72	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	-23.10	-23.10	-23.10	-9.68	-9.68	-9.68	
	Capital/Output Ratio	18.78	20.15	20.15	5.36	6.43	6.43	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	-6.87	-7.70	-7.70	-6.87	-7.47	-7.47	
	<b><i>Recovery, 1983–2000</i></b>							
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	4.43	1.57	3.66	4.43	2.53	4.31	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	3.86	3.86	3.86	3.34	3.34	3.34	
	Capital/Output Ratio	-46	-2.63	-1.10	.06	-1.20	.02	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	1.03	.34	.90	1.03	.39	.95	
	Mexico	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–87</i></b>						
		Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-3.28	-3.08	-3.08	-3.28	-4.48	-4.48
Due to Total Factor Productivity		-10.45	-10.45	-10.45	-4.94	-4.94	-4.94	
Capital/Output Ratio		7.30	9.16	9.16	1.78	2.67	2.67	
Hours per Working-Age Person		-12	-1.79	-1.79	-12	-2.21	-2.21	
<b><i>Stagnation, 1987–95</i></b>								
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		-.66	-1.60	-.10	-.66	-1.45	.09	
Due to Total Factor Productivity		-2.58	-2.58	-2.58	-.81	-.80	-.81	
Capital/Output Ratio		2.23	1.55	2.33	.46	-.31	.45	
Hours per Working-Age Person		-.31	-.57	.15	-.31	-.34	.45	
<b><i>Recovery, 1995–2000</i></b>								
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		3.04	1.34	2.51	3.04	1.90	2.46	
Due to Total Factor Productivity	4.44	4.44	4.44	2.67	2.67	2.67		
Capital/Output Ratio	-2.59	-4.23	-3.07	-.82	-1.92	-1.32		
Hours per Working-Age Person	1.19	1.13	1.14	1.19	1.15	1.11		

Source: Author calculations

Table B2 Alternative Utility Functions

Country	Time Period & Variable	Data	% Change in Real Output With				
			Less Intertemporal Substitutability ( $\phi=-1$ )		Higher Population Weight ( $\eta=1$ )		
			Experiments		Experiments		
			<i>Base Case</i>	<i>Tax Reform</i>	<i>Base Case</i>	<i>Tax Reform</i>	
Chile	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–83</i></b>						
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-11.19	-10.87	-10.87	-11.74	-11.74	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	-9.68	-9.68	-9.68	-9.68	-9.68	
	Capital/Output Ratio	5.36	5.87	5.87	6.53	6.53	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	-6.87	-7.06	-7.06	-8.59	-8.58	
	<b><i>Recovery, 1983–2000</i></b>						
	Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	4.43	2.72	4.27	2.15	3.89	
	Due to Total Factor Productivity	3.53	3.53	3.53	3.53	3.53	
	Capital/Output Ratio	-1.13	-1.27	-26	-1.75	-59	
	Hours per Working-Age Person	1.03	.46	1.00	.37	.95	
	Mexico	<b><i>Crisis, 1981–87</i></b>					
		Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person	-3.28	-4.50	-4.50	-4.41	-4.41
Due to Total Factor Productivity		-5.24	-5.24	-5.24	-5.24	-5.24	
Capital/Output Ratio		2.08	3.13	3.13	3.70	3.70	
Hours per Working-Age Person		-1.12	-2.39	-2.39	-2.87	-2.87	
<b><i>Stagnation, 1987–95</i></b>							
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		-.66	-1.58	-.19	-1.95	-.63	
Due to Total Factor Productivity		-.99	-.99	-.99	-.99	-.99	
Capital/Output Ratio		.64	-.09	.48	-.04	.45	
Hours per Working-Age Person		-.31	-.50	.32	-.92	-.09	
<b><i>Recovery, 1995–2000</i></b>							
Change in Real Output per Working-Age Person		3.04	1.94	2.43	1.64	2.29	
Due to Total Factor Productivity	2.59	2.59	2.59	2.59	2.59		
Capital/Output Ratio	-.74	-1.80	-1.18	-2.21	-1.54		
Hours per Working-Age Person	1.19	1.15	1.02	1.26	1.24		

Source: Author calculations



## References

- Aspe, Pedro. 1993. *Economic transformation the Mexican way*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Atkeson, Andrew, and Kehoe, Patrick J. 1995. Industry evolution and transition: Measuring investment in organization capital. Research Department Staff Report 201. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Barandiarán, Edgardo, and Hernández, Leonardo. 1999. Origins and resolution of a banking crisis: Chile 1982–86. Working Paper 57. Banco Central de Chile.
- Bergoing, Raphael; Kehoe, Patrick J.; Kehoe, Timothy J.; and Soto, Raimundo. 2002. A decade lost and found: Mexico and Chile in the 1980s. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 5 (January): 166–205.
- Bosworth, Barry P.; Dornbusch, Rudiger; and Labán, Raúl, ed. 1994. *The Chilean economy: Policy lessons and challenges*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Burnside, Craig; Eichenbaum, Martin; and Rebelo, Sergio. 1993. Labor hoarding and the business cycle. *Journal of Political Economy* 101 (April): 245–73.
- Camhi, Alexis; Engel, Eduardo M.; and Micco, Alejandro. 1997. Dinámica de empleo y productividad en manufacturas: Evidencia micro y consecuencias macro. In *Análisis empírico del crecimiento en Chile*, ed. Felipe G. Morandé and Rodrigo M. Vergara, pp. 197–225. Santiago, Chile: ILADES–Georgetown University.
- Chu, Tianshu. 2001. Exit barriers and economic stagnation: The macro-impact of government subsidies to industries. Manuscript. East-West Center.
- Clerides, Sofronis K.; Lach, Saul; and Tybout, James R. 1998. Is learning by exporting important? Micro-dynamic evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 113 (August): 903–47.
- Corbo, Vittorio. 1985. Reforms and macroeconomic adjustments in Chile during 1974–84. *World Development* 13 (August): 893–916.
- Corbo, Vittorio, and Fischer, Stanley. 1994. Lessons from the Chilean stabilization and recovery. In *The Chilean economy: Policy lessons and challenges*, ed. Barry P. Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Raúl Labán, pp. 29–68. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- De la Cuadra, Sergio, and Hachette, Dominique. 1991. Liberalizing foreign trade: Chile. In *Liberalizing foreign trade*, Vol. 1, *The experience of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay*, ed. Demetris Papageorgiou, Michael Michaely, and Armeane Choksi, pp. 169–319. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
- Djankov, Simeon; La Porta, Raphael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; and Shleifer, Andrei. 2002. The regulation of entry. *Journal of Political Economy* 117 (February): 1–37.
- Edwards, Alejandra Cox, and Edwards, Sebastián. 1991. *Monetarism and liberalization: The Chilean experiment*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Edwards, Sebastián. 1998. Two crises: Inflationary inertia and credibility. *Economic Journal* 108 (May): 680–702.
- Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna Jacobson. 1963. *A monetary history of the United States, 1867–1960*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Galal, Ahmed; Jones, Leroy P.; Tandon, Pankaj; and Vogelsang, Ingo. 1994. *Welfare consequences of selling public enterprises: An empirical analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.
- Galvez, Julio, and Tybout, James. 1985. Microeconomic adjustments in Chile during 1977–81: The importance of being a *grupo*. *World Development* 13 (August): 969–94.
- Glade, William. 1996. Privatization: Pictures of a process. In *Bigger economies, smaller governments: Privatization in Latin America*, ed. William Glade with Rossana Corona, pp. 3–24. Boulder Colo.: Westview Press.
- Gollin, Douglas. Forthcoming. Getting income shares right. *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Gruben, William, and Welch, John H. 1996. Distortions and resolutions in Mexico's financial system. In *Changing structure of Mexico: Political, social, and economic prospects*, ed. Laura Randall, pp. 63–75. London: Sharpe.
- Hachette, Dominique, and Lüders, Rolf J. 1993. *Privatization in Chile: An economic appraisal*. San Francisco: ICS Press.
- Hayashi, Fumio, and Prescott, Edward C. 2002. The 1990s in Japan: A lost decade. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 5 (January): 206–35.
- Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Parker, Jonathan A. 2001. Taxes and growth in a financially underdeveloped country: Explaining the Chilean investment boom. Manuscript. Princeton University.
- Kehoe, Timothy J. 1995. A review of Mexico's trade policy from 1982 to 1994. *World Economy* 18: 135–51.
- La Porta, Rafael, and Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio. 1999. The benefits of privatization: Evidence from Mexico. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (November): 1193–1242.
- Larraín, Felipe, and Vergara, Rodrigo. 2000. Un cuarto de siglo de reformas fiscales. In *La transformación económica de Chile*, ed. Felipe Larraín and Rodrigo Vergara, pp. 71–109. Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios Públicos.
- Levinsohn, James, and Petrin, Amil K. 1999. When industries become more productive, do firms? Working Paper 6893. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Lustig, Nora. 1998. *Mexico: The remaking of an economy*. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Pavcnik, Nina. Forthcoming. Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: Evidence from Chilean plants. *Review of Economic Studies*.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. 1989. The debt overhang of developing countries. In *Debt, stabilization and development: Essays in memory of Carlos Díaz-Alejandro*, ed. Ronald E. Findlay, Guillermo Calvo, Pentti Kouri, and Jorge Braga de Macedo, pp. 80–102. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sanhueza, Gonzalo I. 2001. Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s: Solutions and estimation of the costs. Working Paper 104. Banco Central de Chile.
- United Nations. 1986. *National accounts statistics: Main aggregates and detailed tables, 1984*. New York: United Nations.